Te Mark of the Mental Alberto Voltolini (Uni of Turin)

B3 makes mental states irreducible to intentional states - but necessary, not sufficient (“BC”)

“Intentionalism is the view that all mental states exhibit intentionality” -Crane

Pure vs Impure vs Spurious intentionalism (reduc. or nonreduc.) (chalmers, crane, dretske) unimportant

Moderate or radical anti-intentionalism (peacocke, searle for mod) goes against weak int’ism

So: defending mod attacks BC

“Esteroceptive” sensations ? “Mental paint” weakly intentional -- moods or proprioceptive non-intentional

...Q: Imagining a two-horned unicorn does not make it a goat...

Crane would answer for moods that they approach “the whole world” but then how does nonexistence enter as part of the intentional state in this case? A: moods are complex qualitative states

So revise the former claim by Crane- intero/proprioceptive states are directed at the body-sensation. Coro: Phantom limb shows that there are cases of int. states on sensations without objects --body part in question is presented in a certain Mode as well