Brentano, Goff, and the Unity of Consciousness Or: Brentano and the Combination Problem Ludwig Jaskolla (Hochschule für Philosophie, München) ludwig.jaskolla@hfph.de

The combination problem- to criticize panpsychist theories

Finding a substantial account of panpsychism is hard, but the common thread is “type-F monism” -the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical states Galen Strawson has a physicalist panexperientialism - like to William james’s “mind-stuff” (HOMs are compounds)

Goff’s micro-experiential zombies - lack of unity among “micro perceptions” as if being held by independent entities

(C) a macro-subject is composed of a definite set of micro-subjects

Goff’s answer - NSS - “Subjects of experience do not seem to entail the existence of other subjects of experience in the way that spatial objects entail the existence of other spatial objects”

(D) If subjects of experience are strong unities, NSS holds true. his implies that (c) needs to be false

Mereology - children can play with Lego blocks and rearrange their shapes in any number of ways- but the children themselves are still separate

--- Peter simon’s book “parts” (mereological examination)

So the issue is to identify when me sum the parts of a thing to make a whole or not.

Brentano can help here: Does not hold that unity must hold the concept of simplicity But what accounts for the identity? -joint inner perception (photo - »Einheit des Bewusstseins«)

...really need to recommend tononi’s paper to Jaskolla

Leibnizian monads must be seen as macro-subjects, and must not be confused with micro-experiences