Strong Phenomenal Intentionality vs. the Holism of Non-Demonstrative Inference Anders Nes (CSMN, Uni of Oslo) anders.nes@csmn.uio.no

’strong’ phenomenal int- Any int state I wi content p Either (a) is phenom. conscious Or (b) depends on phenom conscious states (Kriegel, Searle, G. Strawson, Brentano)

AW claims background assumptions: (Pamphlet:”BAIT”) examp. (Nice Café => coffee!)

Question raised by AW - ba's included are rational, or causal? A1: “phenomenal inclusion (pamphlet) Support- •“Thought is very quick and very rich” - Strawson 2008 (...really? Has he ever tried careful deliberation?) •Searle on “overflow” (1992), peripheral (extra-attentional) C •Husserl on implicit intentionality

-reflective access seems to fit “self-interpretation” (?) model better than recall

Prinz (2012) -learning that extra-attentional vision would be surprising - not so learning the same of BAs

A2: dispositionalism (Pamphlet) The Simple Equation: S assumes that p iff S is disposed, given Consideration of p, to judge that p Support: Brentano 1924 Searle 1992

AW- insufficient! (examp. John believes people who smile unreliable) (pamphlet) Unnecessary! (Pamphlet) Lesson: dispositions towards judg with a BA depends on other BAs (web-of-props theory?) ’laterally’ (in quotes mine)

Functionalist response: (1) develop rules for that web- key truths about how BAs interact

A3: interpretivism (pamphlet) ... “Ideal interpreter” (?)

AW- worries: 1. Shy Creature (Byrne 1998) / Killer Yellow (Kripke) SC changes mind based on prediction of interpretation in future (self-conscious philosophers?) 2. “How can a real conscious conclusion depend at once rationally and causally on an ’irreal’ BA.?” (Kriegel 2011) Instrumentalist “cannot appeal to unobservables for purposes of explaining phenomena” (Kitcher 1989)

Answer- (pamphlet)


Q: “ideal interpreter” - in possession of all the non-mental facts and knowing the conscious states