Phenomenal Intentionality and its Alleged Hard Problem Amir Horowitz (Open University of Israel)

PI doesn't seem to give rise to the same anti-physicalist args of the HP

Horgan and Tienson (photo)

Introspection supports this view of phenomenal intentionality (PI) “Experiences have their contents intrinsically”

But: introspection by itself cannot reveal intentional contents, since they are relational

Reply: introspection can reveal purport to represent (Loar)

Reply to Loar: “Purport intentionality” ’invades the realm’ of the represented external entities, and such cannot be revealed via introspection

Arrow metaphor? No- arrows ’do not represent’ and do not ’purport to represent intrinsically

The Q: why think that exp have their int props intrinsically? Lang/mind examp 1. Language derives its int frm the mind 2. Intentionality of mind is intrinsic

On 1- interpretive difference (we choose to ascribe the contents of language to the mind) On 2- Regress is a specter (no one can “have” the intentionality) Searle - Non-mental entities have int. states)answer: equivocation on the use of ’appear’)

. Concept of intentionality as transcendence forbids intrinsic intentionality Or: . If language cannot have intrinsic intentionality (and the problem is not with tits being language), neither can the mind (or anything else) have intrinsic intentionality.

Just as relation between language and intentionality is a matter of interpretation, so the relation between phenomenal properties and intentionality is also a matter of interpretation

- Naturalized Intentionality as an alternative:

  1. NI is not intrinsic
  2. NI doesn't necessarily single out the phenomenal (and has shorter causal chains than that of language)
  3. NI is revisionist (doesn't reflect phenomenology of the intentional)
  4. NI is a matter of interpretation - taken explicitly or not

Just a concept of about-ness. Nothing else (or phil’s would never understand each other)

Interpretavist Approach: Intentional irrealism Eliminativist- nothing really had intentionality, we only ascribe it (ascripting to be understood syntactically) Is an ’error theory’


NOTE can we consider the ’other side’ of the intentional relation, as it's defining characteristic (I.e., that content is sufficient to the int relation but not necessary)? Furthermore, going by my assumption that counterfactual contents are necessary for phenomenal consciousness to exist then presupposes that the other side of this intentional relation cannot be apprehended phenomenally- the ’source’, so to speak, of an intentional state (I.e., “that which is having the intentional state”) is a singleton, like the case with logical connectives.